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Have We Made It? Investigating Value-creating Strategies in Early Internationalizing 
Ventures 
 
Introduction 
In this paper we study how and whether international new ventures (INVs) made it beyond 
their start-up or internationalizing phase, aiming to generate early theoretical constructs to 
guide international entrepreneurship research in this substantive area. We define an INV as a 
new venture that seeks profits from international activities right from its inception or 
immediately after (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994). We define the made-it point as an 
entrepreneurial threshold at which point an INV undergoes “a transition from the emergence 
to the professional management stage” (Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004, p. 41). At the same 
time, we view the made-it point as a process of emergence of the entrepreneurial threshold – 
a process that implies “…the creation of a new conceptualization, not always conscious, 
within which the entrepreneur’s organizing is re-contextualized” (Lichtenstein et al., 2006, p. 
169).  
 
We position the paper at the intersection of international entrepreneurship and dynamic 
capabilities, aiming to address a number of gaps in these research fields. Despite numerous 
empirical studies (for review, see Jones et al., 2011), the research in international 
entrepreneurship has focused mainly on how and why INVs internationalize from their 
inception (Jones and Coviello, 2005; Jones et al., 2011). The evolutionary patterns of INVs 
(Bingham, 2009; Sleuwaegen and Onkelinx, 2014) as well as the effect of early 
internationalization on organizational survival and growth (Zahra, 2005; Sapienza et al., 
2006) are less understood (Almor et al., 2014). 
 
  
 
Given that empirical research in international entrepreneurship on continued corporate 
growth in INVs beyond their start-up phase or initial internationalization is scarce, we 
explore how INVs transition from the start-up or internationalizing phase to the phase of 
having internationalized, or even whether they actually made-it to that phase.  
 
Within the dynamic capabilities view of the firm (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003; 
Sapienza et al., 2006; Zahra et al., 2006; Teece, 2007), a general consensus emerges that 
“…the concept of dynamic capabilities is insufficiently underpinned by empirical data” 
(Easterby-Smith and Prieto, 2008, p. 237) and that “much remains to be learned about the 
underlying mechanisms, processes, and intermediate outcomes associated with dynamic 
capabilities” (Easterby-Smith et al., 2009, p. S3). To the above, the extant research on 
dynamic capabilities has focused chiefly on established companies, whereas research on post-
entry dynamic capabilities in new ventures is relatively scant (Zahra et al., 2006; for 
exception see, e.g., Lichtenstein et al., 2006; Bingham, 2009; Autio et al., 2011). In this 
paper, we explore value-creating activities entrepreneurs pursue to achieve a threshold level 
of practiced activity – a made-it point – possibly leading up to a steady state of the venture 
for the first time. We argue that, by understanding whether and how INVs reach their made-it 
points, we would enhance our understanding of how early internationalization affects 
organizational survival and growth. 
 
Conceptual Background 
To get to a made-it point or pass the entrepreneurial threshold, entrepreneurs constantly 
construct, re-construct, and de-construct the way they conceptualize their ventures. Such 
iterations are “…punctuated, coordinated shift[s] in multiple modes of entrepreneurial 
  
organizing at virtually the same time, which generate a qualitatively different state – a new 
identity – within the nascent venture” (Lichtenstein et al., 2006, p. 154). These iterations are 
part of organizational and strategic routines – dynamic capabilities – by which entrepreneurs 
alter their ventures’ state or organizational gestalt to generate new value-creating strategies 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). We define organizational gestalt as consisting of mutually 
supportive organizational system elements combined with appropriate resources and 
behavioral patterns (Covin and Slevin, 1997). We view dynamic capabilities as a venture’s 
capacity to reconfigure its organizational gestalt in order to adapt to its environment 
(Sapienza et al., 2006).  
 
The literature differentiates between two types of capabilities: substantive and dynamic 
(Winter, 2003; Zahra et al., 2006). Substantive capability refers to a venture’s ability to solve 
a problem or produce a desired output, be this tangible or intangible; whereas dynamic 
capability refers to a venture’s ability to change and reconfigure substantive capabilities. In 
the context of INVs, it could be expected for these ventures to have substantive capabilities, 
e.g., how to develop a software program, but to rather lack dynamic capabilities, e.g., how to 
change the way this program is developed in order to meet new and constantly changing 
customers’ needs. Consequently, Zahra et al. (2006) suggest linking these two types of 
capabilities to ability rather than performance, and further suggest making explicit the role of 
decision-makers in enacting and directing such capabilities. 
 
For a capability, i.e., a routine, to become established, it must have reached some threshold 
level of practiced activity (Helfat and Peteraf 2003; Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). The 
primary methods for discovering or developing dynamic capabilities are through trial-and-
error, improvisation, and imitation (Zahra et al., 2006; Autio et al., 2010). We define these 
  
methods as strategic experimentation, that is “…a series of trial and error changes pursued 
along various dimensions of strategy, over a relatively short period of time, in an effort to 
identify and establish a viable basis for competing” (Nicholls-Nixon et al., p. 496). Compared 
to established organizations that have well-established capabilities, which these organizations 
may modify, new ventures can merely experiment with their organizational gestalt in order to 
create new dynamic capabilities for the first time (Autio et al., 2011). Entrepreneurs 
experiment with their ventures to create value at different levels of the venture by acquiring, 
shedding, integrating, and recombining resources to generate new value-creating strategies 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Lichtenstein et al. (2006) found that, in the process of 
emergence, entrepreneurs experiment with their young venture – the organizational gestalt – 
at three levels: goal (vision), decision (strategic), and behavioral (tactical), and create, re-
create, conceptualize and re-conceptualize, contextualize and re-contextualize respective 
activities at each level. An entrepreneur experiments: at the first level, with the concept of the 
venture that is organized around the opportunity s/he pursues; at the second level, with 
strategic and functional-related decisions, actions and interventions; and at the third level, 
with the timing of enacting specific events. 
 
For example, at the first level, entrepreneurs may improvise with opportunity selection to 
take advantage of various emerging foreign market entry opportunities (Bingham, 2009). 
However, as Bingham (2009) warns, more improvisation in opportunity selection may result 
in less successful country entries since it makes opportunity selection inefficient and 
incoherent. On the other hand, according to Bingham (2009), less improvisation mainly 
reduces distracting, short-term behavior, improves organizational learning, and simplifies the 
complexities associated with accumulating heterogeneous experience. At the second level, 
entrepreneurs improvise with opportunity execution. Here, according to Bingham (2009), 
  
more improvisation is beneficial for opportunity execution as it allows for more flexibility to 
improvise and helps avoid failure traps and, in turn, the escalation of commitment to a failing 
course of action. As for the timing of acquiring and enacting specific capabilities, Bingham 
(2009, p. 342) emphasizes the importance of sequencing as the two phases of improvisation 
are “…intimately interconnected”. Entrepreneurs may also experiment with market-managing 
capabilities and market-creating capabilities (Holcomb et al., 2007) in order to create value. 
Former value-creating strategies are value-enabling as they exploit existing product-market 
positions and affect current performance of the new venture by focusing on existing, known 
operating routines. The latter ones are value-enhancing as they are directed towards 
influencing the performance of a new venture in the future by altering the new venture’s scale 
and scope (e.g., developing new products and entering new geographic markets).  
 
In new ventures such as INVs, dynamic capabilities are seen as simple, experiential, unstable 
processes that rely on quickly-created knowledge and iterative execution to produce adaptive, 
but unpredictable outcomes (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). In a new venture, it will take 
several iterations for a dynamic capability to emerge, get established, and create value. Zahra 
et al. (2006) cautions that a high number of iterations to change and improve a dynamic 
capability inevitably results in a high number of failed experiments that in turn may 
“…damage a new venture’s credibility and even lead to its demise” (p. 950). In this regard, 
Zahra et al. (2006) suggest that the emergence and establishment of dynamic capabilities are 
not necessarily associated with higher performance, despite the fact that dynamic capabilities 
sustain a new venture’s competitive advantage, especially in complex, uncertain, and volatile 
external environments. In the same vein, Bingham (2009) demonstrated that firms that 
decrease improvisation in opportunity selection but increase improvisation in opportunity 
execution are more successful in foreign market entries.  
  
 
In the context of our research, (strategic) experimentation, as a theoretical construct, may 
explain the process of emergence and establishment of dynamic capabilities. As Zahra (2005, 
p. 24) argues, “Experimentation is essential for INVs to discover the winning business model 
and market recipe. Openness to this sort of experimentation is a must”. In this paper, we are 
interested in exploring how and whether INVs have made it beyond their startup phase, 
which experiments entrepreneurs conduct in order to achieve a steady state of the venture, as 
well as in exploring critical events and incidents that contribute to this process.  
 
Method 
Given the scarcity of theoretical understanding and empirical evidence in this substantive 
area of research, we adopted a multiple-case study methodology for the purpose of theory 
building (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991). Following the intensity sampling strategy, we 
purposefully selected information-rich, but not extreme cases (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
We identified two case companies, Soft-Kode and Soft-Med, on the basis of developed 
selection criteria. The case companies are small, high-technology companies located in the 
Oulu ICT cluster in Finland. The companies started up sometime in 2006 or 2007, had 
internationalized rapidly, within 3 years after their inception, and were in business at the time 
of the research. The emergence period is a five or six year period from the moment of the 
new venture inception (Coviello and Jones, 2004; Cesinger et al., 2012). To control for the 
effect of the external environment on selected cases, such as legislation, market size, and 
regional location, we confined the study to a homogeneous empirical context, this being a 
remote region in the Northern Finland. The potential effect of resource bias was also 
controlled for by the size of the selected cases, i.e., both being small that is defined as less 
  
than 100 employees (Storey, 1994). In Table 1, we provide a summary of growth data of the 
case companies.  
 
"Insert Table 1 Here" 
 
Soft-Kode (Appendix 1) is a software company with expertise that covers the whole lifecycle 
of software development, from requirement collection and project planning, to software 
implementation and testing, and all the way to maintenance and support services. Soft-Med 
(Appendix 2) is a health technology company that, through innovation and ongoing neuro-
biological research, aims to deepen the understanding of treating various types of disorders 
and neurological diseases and to manufacture and sell respective products. These comparative 
cases are interesting because they provide us with contrasting empirical contexts, allowing us 
to study, at various operating levels, the positive and negative effects dynamic capabilities 
have on these ventures’ continuing corporate growth. 
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
We initially collected unobtrusive data in the form of running records and mass-media news 
reports from the inception of the case companies. We then conducted in depth interviews 
with key decision makers of the case companies, namely their co-founders and CEOs. The 
interviews were semi-structured in the form of guided conversations, lasted on average sixty 
minutes, were recorded with interviewees’ permissions, and transcribed verbatim 
immediately after. The authors conducted the interviews in English and personally 
transcribed the interviews. Open questions were asked during the encounters, allowing the 
interviewees to do most of the talking. As these were retrospective questions, they were 
framed to clearly distinguish between the time contexts (Coviello, 2015), e.g., between a 
  
start-up and adolescent venture (Turcan, 2006). We controlled the interviews by probing 
critical incidents and clarifying understanding, asking follow-up questions to ensure that a 
comprehensive and detailed account has been given, as well as by avoiding any leading 
questions. For confidentiality reasons, interviewees’ and companies’ names are disguised 
throughout the paper. 
 
To uncover and analyze respective critical events and incidents, we employed critical 
incident technique guidelines for data analysis. Critical incident technique has its origins in 
the research undertaken by Flanagan (1954), and we define it herein as “...a qualitative 
interview procedure that facilitates the investigation of significant occurrences (events, 
incidents, processes or issues) identified by respondents, the way they are managed, and the 
outcomes in terms of perceived effects” (Chell, 1998, p. 56). We consider an event or an 
incident as being critical when it deviates significantly, either positively or negatively, from 
what is normal or expected (Edvardsson, 1992).  
 
As a first step, we initially identified and described critical incidents for the case companies. 
In Appendix 1 and 2, employing a critical event chart (Miles and Huberman, 1994), we 
present the chronological flow of critical events of the case companies. We then focused on 
similarities and differences between the cases and chose a frame of reference to more 
accurately classify and analyze the data. The made-it point – whether achieved or not – was 
chosen as an initial frame of reference alongside goal (vision), decision (strategic) and 
behavioral (tactical) levels (Lichtenstein et al., 2006). The next step in data analysis is 
category or concept formulation, which represents an induction of categories from the basic 
data in the form of incidents (Flanagan, 1954). The last step in data analysis according to 
critical incident technique is to determine the most appropriate level of specificity-generality 
  
to use in reporting the data. In this part of data analysis, we borrowed a coding technique 
from Grounded Theory methodology, namely theoretical coding (Glaser 2005). During data 
analysis process, we moved from open codes to theoretical codes; Table 2 exemplifies the 
coding process. Data pertinent to each case were coded in an iterative manner, working back 
and forth between theory, emerging patterns, and data. Quotes from interviews and examples 
from unobtrusive data are used extensively to illustrate the events, incidents, processes, and 
issues that had, to various degrees, an impact on the process of emergence and establishment 
of the made-it points (Pratt, 2008). 
 
"Insert Table 2 Here" 
 
Findings 
In this section we present the emergent constructs related to value-creating strategies, which 
steer towards made-it points. Grounded in data, the following constructs emerged related to 
value creation: tensions, experimentation, and legitimacy lies. These findings are presented 
below. 
 
Gestalt tensions 
Our analysis suggests that tensions in the organizational gestalt fuel entrepreneurs’ 
experimentation efforts. As part of our theoretical coding (Table 2), we defined tension as a 
relationship between ideas or qualities with conflicting demands or implications (Tension, 
n.d.). We observed such tensions at the various levels of the organizational gestalt. Over the 
years, Soft-Kode owners were struggling to optimize the ownership structure of their venture: 
whether it should be a partnership, joint venture, or a holding. As of today, just over 5 years 
after the creation of the holding, the Soft-Kode owners have realized that such a holding 
  
structure is not optimal and they are considering changing the organizational ownership 
structure. As one of Soft-Kode owners explained: 
“Was it wise to create that holding? Although it was fun at the beginning to build it, it 
actually cost us a lot of money. We are now thinking to break everything down – to 
simplify the companies, having shareholders as private persons rather companies or 
institutions – thus allowing us to make decisions lot easier, rather to have a too 
lengthy decision process” – Soft-Kode CEO/co-owner.  
 
In the same vein, the Soft-Med owners had conflicting views over the ownership structure 
when it came to deciding whether or not to accept venture funding. The tension was between 
“…freedom to do things” as one of co-owners said, and the risk of going bankrupt due to a 
lack of funding. Given the nature of the tension, the Soft-Med owners found themselves 
enslaved rather than in a happy marriage (Turcan, 2008). As the Soft-Med CEO/co-owner 
mentioned:     
“What I would change relates to how much power I keep to myself. Clearly, without 
an investment I would not be able to make it so fast and scale [our venture] up in 
those timelines. If I were more jealous when it came to power, nobody would have 
turned to me to scale [the venture] up” – Soft-Med CEO/co-owner.  
 
Having been the entrepreneurs of their respective ventures over six years, they were yet 
struggling to identify their ventures’ business propositions to the market. It was interesting to 
observe that these tensions were persistent despite the existence of substantive capabilities 
such as experience and knowledge in project-based software development, R&D, and 
prototyping; in the case of Soft-Kode, this tension is still there. As the entrepreneurs 
explained:  
  
“Nowadays we have not been able to define what we are doing: are we selling 
projects, or resources? We were never able to define which one is the way to go or 
should we do both and how to market them and how to differ in the market with these 
two products or these two ways of doing business and which one would be better” – 
Soft-Kode co-owner. 
“First ideas we had were to sell via doctors and clinics. But we did understand this 
route is more time and money consuming… We decided to be quite unique and take 
our product straight to the customers. Actually, we not selling a product, we are 
selling a science” – Soft-Med CEO/co-owner.  
 
One of the entrepreneurs’ major concerns was how to ensure the quality of the process of 
product development and how to scale up their businesses much faster. In this, they faced the 
dilemma, for example, between outsourcing and insourcing, and between traditional 
marketing and social media marketing. These types of tensions are exemplified below:    
“In Vietnam we hit the same tree [as in Bangladesh] when the partner there lost 
interest in us as they accepted orders from bigger companies. After such incidents, we 
decided that the only way to continue was to own the developers and thus control 
everything that is related to the process of software development – otherwise it is hard 
to keep the deadlines whatever we promise to the customers. In order to ensure the 
quality of the product we have to control the whole process” – Soft-Kode CEO/co-
owner.  
“I even do not like the idea to make marketing with money; now with the current 
technology, our product could be very easily peer-reviewed by our and other 
customers, bloggers, and everybody. Anything marketed with money looks like a lie... 
  
you should be able to deliver your message without money as this is the message 
people will believe in” – Soft-Med CEO/co-owner. 
 
Strategic experimentation 
Experimentation was identified as a means that entrepreneurs employ to create value in their 
ventures. For the purpose of theoretical coding (Table 2), building on Covin and Slevin 
(1997) and Nicholls-Nixon et al. (2000, p. 496) we view experimentation as a “series of trial 
and error changes pursued along various dimensions of [organizational gestalt], over a 
relatively short period of time, in an effort to identify and establish a viable basis for 
competing”. Entrepreneurs were experimenting with the dimensions of organizational gestalt 
at various levels in order to reach a threshold of entrepreneurial activity – the made-it point.  
 
The entrepreneurs, six years after starting-up their ventures, were still improvising with 
opportunity selection (Bingham, 2009) in order to single out the most profitable opportunity 
to pursue and design a corresponding business model to take advantage of that opportunity. 
The difference in this process between the two ventures was the timing and sequence of 
improvisation. The owners of Soft-Kode were experimenting with all identified opportunities 
concurrently. Whereas the owners of Soft-Med started improvising when they realized that 
their product was captive (Turcan, 2012) to a niche that “is very small, with maximum 
penetration we can get”, as the Soft-Med CEO/co-owner explained. The quotes below 
exemplify the points just discussed: 
“In addition to project-based software development, we were also trying to specialize 
on various technology platforms and this experiment lasted something like 6 or 9 
months and after that we saw that there is a need to focus: let’s focus on one thing, 
  
build one big development unit and grow it to the size we want” – Soft-Kode CEO/co-
owner. 
“The product we currently have is not a breakthrough product – it deals with the 
problem, but does not cure. We aim to have a product that will cure as well, for 
example, cardio-vascular system. History will be when we really break in cure 
business” – Soft-Med CEO/co-owner. 
 
Once an agreement is reached on which opportunity to pursue, entrepreneurs switch their 
attention to the strategic and functional areas of their ventures (Lichtenstein et al., 2006) and 
improvise on opportunity execution (Bingham, 2009). It was interesting to observe that sales 
and marketing were not entrepreneurs’ primary concerns in this improvisation process; they 
were rather concerned, and hence experimenting, with R&D and product development 
processes (this might not be surprising given their engineering backgrounds). During this 
type of experimentation or improvisation with opportunity execution, entrepreneurs acquire 
dynamic capabilities that contribute to the attainment of a made-it point – be this an efficient 
product development process or an effective product launch.    
“[To develop an internal quality product development process] was a non-stop 
process as the company grew, as it was necessary to focus on quality, and process 
issues all the time. I think it was 2008 when I realized that the system that was put in 
place worked” – Soft-Kode CEO/co-owner.  
“We started our sales quite early with a product that was very ugly by design – very 
rough, ugly prototype. In 2010, we sold 2500 units without making any marketing. 
The number of people who wanted to buy our product was increasing, even if you 
could not deliver it” - Soft-Med CEO/co-owner. 
 
  
One of the main differences we observed between these two ventures in this improvisation 
process (opportunity execution) was that Soft-Kode was experimenting to seek efficiency, 
whereas Soft-Med was experimenting to seek efficacy. We term these two types of 
experimentation as efficiency-seeking and efficacy-seeking and argue that each type requires 
specific dynamic-capabilities: efficiency-seeking and efficacy-seeking. The above also 
suggests that there is a difference in the timing of efficiency-seeking experimentation and 
efficacy-seeking experimentation.  
 
Further in our data analysis we observed that the process of experimentation or improvisation 
(Fisher, 2012) is moderated by the availability of funding, with contradicting signs of the 
relationship. In the case of Soft-Med, less funding available led to less improvisation with the 
opportunity selection and more improvisation with opportunity execution. In the case of Soft-
Kode the opposite was observed: less funding led to more improvisation with opportunity 
selection and less improvisation with opportunity execution, as respective entrepreneurs 
explained:  
“Less money you have you are hibernating, you have much more time to think about 
[your product] – you cannot do wrong things when you have less money. If we had 
more money, our concept would have been messier – maybe making mobile phone 
applications, etc. – or something else that would have hindered the process. Now we 
have to make it very raw, very simple and only one feature product” – Soft-Med 
CEO/owner.  
“We got busy with other projects…We never started lifting the company – we need a 
little bit of hard working to lift it up. We can make it a profitable business” – Soft-
Kode CEO/owner. 
 
  
Legitimacy lies  
Our analysis reveals that entrepreneurs may mitigate their ventures’ liabilities of newness, 
smallness, and foreignness (Stinchcombe, 1965; Zaheer, 1995; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002) 
by telling legitimacy lies: another value-creating strategy. As a theoretical code (Table 2), we 
defined legitimacy lies as “…intentional misrepresentations of the facts” (Rutherford et al., 
2009, p. 950). For example, the Soft-Kode founders were taking orders from customers when 
they did not have a proper product development process in place. As one of the co-owners 
explained, “we tried to hide ourselves and avoid proactive sales and marketing”. At the same 
time, in order to get orders from large companies, like Nokia, their venture had to be of a 
certain size: no less than 50 employees. At one point, in order to get a large contract from a 
large company (as an early customer), Soft-Kode had to demonstrate that it employed at least 
50 employees, as explained by the CEO/co-owner:  
“We were told that we need to have a 50 guys company, and only then we might get 
large projects from the large companies. That was our first level. At the end of 2008, 
beginning of 2009 we achieved this number - near 50 guys as we had to calculate all 
taxi drivers, and cleaning ladies – to look big” – Soft-Kode CEO/co-owner. 
“When we reached 50 guys, something happened - we started getting good deals, 
large projects and better customers. Since then, we were getting more and more 
customers all the time” – Soft-Kode co-owner.  
 
A legitimacy lie, as a subjective construct, is indeed in the eye of the beholder. Some of Soft-
Med’s stakeholders believed its products were not based on science and thus did not cure 
what they claimed to cure. This perception was mainly due to the unorthodox route to market 
(for the medical sector) that Soft-Made adopted by selling their products directly to 
customers rather than via doctors and clinics. As a result, Soft-Med’s medical experiments 
  
and results were questioned, and Soft-Med ran into resistance and negative publicity in the 
national mass media. The quotes below illustrate the above struggle:    
“There are big pharmacy companies – they make look everything too scientific. But 
there is an alternative way – selling products over the counter straight to customers. 
Tricky problems with various magazines are inevitable when you break the rules” – 
Soft-Med CEO/co-owner. 
“Soft-Med’s supporting evidence was made by non-medical outsiders, lacked basic 
research, with no single article ever written about the topic. Soft-Med had to make 
their products look like something scientific” – from mass-media publications. 
 
Made-it or Not 
Whether or not entrepreneurs and/or their ventures made-it is a matter of perception. The data 
point to two levels at which the made-it concept applies: entrepreneur level and venture level. 
At the entrepreneur level, entrepreneurs mentioned their own made-it point, highlighting their 
own learning experience as well as their own financial performance: 
“I have my own personal made-it point and I think I have achieved it. I have learned 
so much from this experience that is much better than any MBA course that you can 
take in any university… I do not consider myself as green anymore” – Soft-Kode co-
owner. 
“Indeed, I fulfilled my personal goal. My aim wasn’t to gain millions… Soft-Med 
product for me wasn’t very technically challenging product, and contributed to the 
launch of a new product to the market” – Soft-Med co-owner.  
 
When asked whether their ventures made-it, entrepreneurs did not see their ventures 
achieving it:   
  
“I was just thinking that probably we have not graduated yet – we did not stop being a 
startup; still entrepreneurial rather a professional company. Hopefully the made-it 
point is still to come; hopefully it is in the near future when we for example re-
internationalize, and acquire professional management” – Soft-Kode co-owner. 
“We have not made it – there is scientific resistance – mainly coming from amateur 
scientists – and you have to deal with them the best way you can – that is one of the 
reasons why I do not believe we have made it or are near the turning point” – Soft-
Med CEO/co-owner. 
 
Nonetheless, several relatively concrete made-it points emerged along the organizational 
gestalt, e.g., getting professional management, establishing an optimal organizational 
structure, getting better projects from large customers, making profits, growing in the number 
of employees (see Table 1), taking control over the whole product development process, 
developing their own quality product development procedures, launching and selling the 
product, and getting VC funding, as the following quotes exemplify: 
“Our new customer partnership-building program has 3 levels. We start with 
subcontracting, done by senior developers in Finland. Next step is to start building 
own development and move part of the work to Bangladesh. And finally everything 
moves to us, where there is no more subcontracting – we are actually product 
manager for that company” – Soft-Kode CEO/co-owner.  
“In the winter of 2008-2009 we were doing our clinical trial and receiving our first 
results was a turning point for us... Another turning point for us was to get venture 
capital. In 2010, we sold our first 2500 units: that was a turning point for us as well” 
– Soft-Med CEO/co-owner. 
 
  
Discussion 
In this paper we set out to explore how and whether INVs made it beyond their start-up phase 
or initial internationalization. To address these questions we focused our attention on value-
creating strategies entrepreneurs pursue to get their ventures to pass a threshold level of 
practiced activity, a made-it point. We find entrepreneurs experiment (Zahra, 2005) with and 
reconfigure their venture’s organizational gestalt in order to reach a threshold level of 
practiced activity (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). We further find 
that entrepreneurs’ experimentation efforts are fueled by tensions that exist at goal (vision), 
decision (strategic) and behavioral (tactical) levels of the organizational gestalt. We also find 
that during this experimentation process, entrepreneurs may tell legitimacy lies to legitimate 
their ventures in the eyes of their stakeholders. 
 
Entrepreneurs’ primary concerns were to reach an optimal ownership structure of the venture, 
given the nature of the opportunity pursued; to identify his/her venture’s business proposition 
to the market; and to ensure the quality of processes and operations within the venture. We 
observed that these tensions or concerns were persistent at each level, though for different 
periods of time. For example, at the behavioral (tactical) level, the tensions eased faster 
probably due to the existence of substantive capabilities such as experience and knowledge in 
project-based software development, R&D and prototyping, and product development, which 
in turn made it possible to acquire dynamic capabilities much faster. At the other two levels, 
the tensions were persistent over a longer period due to the lack of substantive capabilities 
and/or capacity to acquire the respective substantive capabilities. This deficiency, we 
maintain, in turn creates a barrier in acquiring the much needed dynamic capabilities to get 
the venture to a made-it point.  
 
  
To mitigate the above tensions, entrepreneurs experiment or improvise with the dimensions 
of organizational gestalt at various levels to reach a threshold of entrepreneurial activity: a 
made-it point. Entrepreneurs improvise with opportunity selection and opportunity execution 
(Bingham, 2009). We find that entrepreneurs may improvise with all identified opportunities 
concurrently or may start improvising with a single new opportunity after realizing the initial 
opportunity identified and pursued did not turn out to be a real one. Once an agreement is 
reached on which opportunity to pursue, entrepreneurs switch their attention to strategic and 
functional areas of their ventures (Lichtenstein et al., 2006) and improvise with opportunity 
execution (Bingham, 2009). We find that entrepreneurs improvise with opportunity execution 
to seek efficiency or efficacy and observe that, in order for this type of improvisation to be 
successful, entrepreneurs need to acquire the respective dynamic capabilities: efficiency-
seeking and efficacy-seeking dynamic capabilities. These observations led us to posit that: 
P1: Entrepreneurs who seek efficacy will tend to improvise with opportunity 
selection consecutively, while those seeking efficiency will tend to improvise 
with opportunity selection simultaneously. 
P2: Respective dynamic capabilities will be acquired faster when seeking 
efficacy, making it possible to reach a made-it point faster as well.  
 
How dynamic capabilities come into existence is an enduring question (Zahra et al., 2006) 
and, although this question was not the focus of our study, from our data we may infer that: 
P3: Experimentation (improvisation) mediates between the exploitation and 
transformation of substantive capabilities and the acquisition and creation of 
dynamic capabilities.  
 
  
The plausibility of this conjecture shall be investigated in future studies, preferably in 
ethnographic research settings to capture the phenomenon in real time rather than post-hoc 
(Zahra et al., 2006). Further in our data we find that: 
P4: The process of experimentation (improvisation) is moderated by the 
availability of resources.  
 
Future research is needed to identify the sign of the relationship in P4 since our findings are 
contradictory. In one case we find that less available resources leads to less improvisation 
with the opportunity selection and more improvisation with opportunity execution. In 
another, the opposite is observed: less availability of resources leads to more improvisation 
with opportunity selection and less improvisation with opportunity execution. 
 
Legitimacy lies (Rutherford et al., 2009) emerged as another type of dynamic capability. We 
view telling legitimacy lies as part of symbolic and impression management (Zott and Huy, 
2007) that “…refers to the process by which individuals attempt to control the impressions 
others form of them” (Leary and Kowalski, 1990, p. 34). We maintain that entrepreneurs tell 
legitimacy lies to compensate for the lack or inadequate quality of substantive capabilities. 
Employing this type of dynamic capability, entrepreneurs aim to gain legitimacy for their 
ventures faster (Zott and Huy, 2007), moving their ventures faster towards a steady state, a 
made-it point. On the other hand, being a subjective construct, legitimacy lies may produce 
the opposite, negative effect whereby ventures’ stakeholders may view or perceive such 
activities as illegitimate (Elsbach and Sutton, 1992) and as clashing with social norms or 
organizational goals (Scott, 1987).    
 
  
We are cautious when it comes to discussing whether INVs have made it or not by creating 
and exploiting various substantive and dynamic capabilities. Here we side with Zahra et al. 
(2006), who warn that, in post hoc studies such as this one, it is difficult to separate the 
existence of dynamic capabilities from their effects. Indeed, despite a number of made-it 
points, we find that the transition from an entrepreneurial to a professionally-run organization 
did not take place (Mintzberg, 1973). This could be explained by the fact that entrepreneurs 
managed to develop substantive capabilities to produce desired outputs at various levels 
within the venture, including personal levels; however, they failed to create dynamic 
capabilities in order to change and reconfigure existing substantive capabilities and 
eventually establish a dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) in the new venture during 
the emergence stage.  
 
Further theorizing 
We have introduced the concept of the made-it point in order to investigate how and whether 
INVs made it beyond their start-up phase or initial internationalization. On the one hand, we 
defined the made-it point as an entrepreneurial threshold, whereby an INV transitions from an 
entrepreneurial to a professionally-led organization. On the other hand, we viewed it as a 
process of emergence of the entrepreneurial threshold. To move the enquiry beyond this 
substantive area of research to get a better understanding of continued growth, evolutionary 
patterns, as well as organizational survival of young entrepreneurial ventures, further 
conceptualization of the made-it point is needed.   
 
We turn to the concept of turning point for this purpose. As a concept, a turning point has a 
number of properties that allow us to advance our understanding of the dynamic capability 
view of the firm. A turning point is a process. As a process, it involves a course correction 
  
(dynamic capability); it redirects the path (new routines or substantive capabilities are 
established), and requires certain strategies and choices (Hareven and Masaoka, 1988; 
Abbott, 2001). A turning point refers to two points in time (Abbott, 2001). For a turning point 
to exist, there should be a passage of sufficient time between the two points (between two 
substantive capabilities), making sure that the direction of the course (trajectory) has been 
changed either in direction or in nature (Abbott, 2001). A turning point can be defined only a 
posteriori. Following this hindsight property, the analysis of a turning point “…makes sense 
only after the fact, when a new trajectory or system state is clearly established” (Abbott, 
2001, p. 250). This property has direct implications on the methodology and methods of 
researching dynamic capabilities in organizations (see also Zahra et al., 2006). Uncertainty 
further defines a turning point; it defines the nature of trajectories or system states on either 
side of a turning point. An event that moves from uncertainty to a trajectory that is certain 
and directional is what Abbott (2001) calls focal turning point. A randomizing turning point, 
according to Abbott, is an event that moves from certainty (or a stable trajectory) to a 
trajectory that is uncertain (or random). For example, researchers may conceptualize the 
dynamic capability in young ventures as a focal turning point whereby steady states (routines 
or substantive capabilities) are sought for the first time at various levels in the organization.  
 
Conclusions 
The central aim of this paper was to explore how and whether INVs made it beyond their 
emergence phase. Given the instrument we employed to explore these questions, our results 
are limited in scope. However, we put forward a number of questions and conjectures to 
guide future research in this, currently, under-researched area of international 
entrepreneurship (Zahra, 2005; Sapienza et al., 2006; Bingham, 2009; Sleuwaegen and 
Onkelinx, 2014). Understanding whether and how INVs reach their made-it points would 
  
contribute to our understanding of how early internationalization affects INVs’ organizational 
survival and growth. We have also suggested employing the concept of turning point in 
future research to advance our understanding of the dynamic capability view of the firm.  
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Table 1: Growth data of case companies 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Soft-Kode Revenue (€, 000) 1004 1192 1071 2103 2438 
 Profit (€, 000) 80 25 11 -69 -34 
 Employees 14 46 28 30 31 
Soft-Med Revenue (€, 000) 15 7 495 1429 1941 
 Profit (€, 000) -4 -89 -571 -602 -289 
 Employees 0 3 12 20 17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2: Coding process exemplified 
Substantive coding (example quotes) Theoretical 
coding 
Definition 
Previously we had freedom to do the things but when VCs come in, they start to build 
it to become a firm. It’s not the same anymore. I felt that it’s not my thing anymore 
and I was also in burn out and lost my motivation. (Co-owner, Soft-Med) 
If I would be more jealous when it comes to power, nobody would have turned to me 
and scaled it up. (CEO/Co-owner, Soft-Med) 
I feel my other partners never understood what could have been the benefit of having 
these people around. And in that sense, we never got out of that maybe startup phase 
where you actually have external people in the board and that you can actually use in 
your benefit. But we always kept all the things in our hand and that is the biggest, in 
my opinion that is the biggest sort of startup disease. (Co-owner, Soft-Kode) 
(Gestalt) tension A relationship between ideas or 
qualities with conflicting demands or 
implications (Tension, n.d.). 
In fact we thought that it works also to [this state] in the very beginning, but we 
decided to start with a more limited [disease]…The markets were more clearly 
structured. (Co-owner, Soft-Med) 
In addition to project-based software development, we were also trying to specialize 
on various technology platforms and this experiment lasted something like 6 or 9 
months and after that we saw that there is a need to focus: let’s focus on one thing, 
build one big development unit and grow it to the size we want. (CEO/co-owner, Soft-
Kode) 
Experimentation A series of trial and error changes 
pursued along various dimensions of 
[organizational gestalt], over a 
relatively short period of time, in an 
effort to identify and establish a 
viable basis for competing (Covin 
and Slevin, 1997; Nicholls-Nixon et 
al., 2000). 
Soft-Med aimed to produce supporting evidence, a challenge for an invention 
unknown to the scientific community, made by non-medical outsiders, with a complete 
lack of basic research, not a single article ever written about the topic. They had to 
make the thing look like something scientific. (A stakeholder of Soft-Med) 
We were told that we need to have a 50 guys company, and only then we might get 
large projects from the large companies. That was our first level. At the end of 2008, 
Legitimacy lies Intentional misrepresentations of the 
facts (Rutherford et al., 2009) 
  
beginning of 2009 we achieved this number - near 50 guys as we had to calculate all 
taxi drivers, and cleaning ladies – to look big. (CEO/co-owner, Soft-Kode) 
Of course completing all the big processes such as medical device approval and sales 
license have been nice ones. But the best moments were when some people, customers 
gave feedback, someone called and told how the product had helped. Even now, 
people come and tell me that our product has helped them. (Co-owner, Soft-Med) 
There are still patterns that we follow in the decision making of the company that are 
not that professional. And there are sometimes some of us still think that we are still 
that 3-5 people company that we used to have development meetings in sauna and a 
bottle of beer Monday mornings, so… in a way as I was thinking about it... maybe we 
haven’t made it at all. (CEO/co-owner, Soft-Kode) 
Made-it point An entrepreneurial threshold, a 
transition from the emergence to the 
professional management stage 
(Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 1: Soft-Kode critical event chart 
 
 
 
 
 
Year QI QII QIII QIV 
2004 The founder moved to 
Bangladesh 
Set-up Soft-Tech 
Software development 
unit in Bangladesh was 
established (not owned 
by Soft-Tech) 
  
2005 Opportunity: “at that 
time everyone was doing 
project based software 
development” 
Two market 
opportunities have been 
identified: 
- Software development 
- 3D modeling 
Future co-founder quit 
Nokia and joined forces 
with the founder 
The founder moved back 
to Finland 
Started Soft-Base 
(replacing Soft-Tech) 
 
  
2006 Soft-Vision became key 
customer for Soft-Base 
(later Soft-Kode) 
Tried to specialize on 
various technology 
platforms 
 
Established a 
development team in 
Vietnam 
A partner in Bangladesh 
did not continue its 
commitments 
A partner in Vietnam did 
not fulfill its 
commitments  
Decided “to control 
everything that is related 
to the process of software 
development” 
Decided to 
- create a holding 
- create own 
development units 
- to focus 
A clear division of 
businesses was 
emerging: software 
development and 3D 
modeling 
Became profitable 
2007 Soft-Base holding was 
created  
Started building own 
software unit in 
Bangladesh 
 
Business was divided 
into 2 areas: 
- Soft-Kode (project-
based software 
development) 
- 3D-Soft (3D 
modeling) 
New co-owner joins in 
 Grew up to 20 employees 
2008    Grew up to 50 
employees: “this was the 
level you need to have to 
get access to the large 
customers in Finland” 
2011    Reached: 
- 2.1 million euros in 
revenue 
- 100 employees 
- 30 customers/month 
2012  The aim is to grow up to 
a 250 employee venture 
  
 
  
Appendix 2: Soft-Med critical event chart 
 
 
 
Year QI QII QIII QIV 
2006   Product idea and  idea to 
start a business emerged 
Received seed funding 
from the Finish 
Innovation Institute 
Started prototype 
development  
First prototype ready 
First patent applied 
based on the prototype  
2007 Soft-Med was 
established 
Paid the patent by 
themselves (did not wait 
to get public funding) 
Finnish Patent Authority 
accepted the patent 
application 
Tested the prototype with 
friends who had [malady 
symptoms]  
Started to seek resources 
for clinical trials 
 Found qualified medical 
doctors to do clinical 
trials 
But were too late to test 
the product against 
[malady symptoms] for 
seasonal reasons 
2008  Received an offer from a 
psychologist who offered 
to do the clinical trials 
with reasonable price 
One of the founders 
became a full-time CEO 
Decided to focus on 
medical device business 
through mass-markets 
(B2C) rather than through 
clinics (B2B) 
Started clinical trials to 
study the response of the 
product against [malady 
symptoms] 
 
 
2009 First research results 
received 
Received positive results 
from clinical trials 
The other founder 
became full-time 
employee at Soft-Med 
Started the specifications 
of the product to 
understand  its dynamics 
and its opportunities  
Raised first ‘external’ 
funding from friends and 
family 
  
2010 Received clinical 
permission from EU 
Two private investors 
and one company 
invested in Soft-Med 
Launched first product to 
the Finnish market 
Opened a web-store 
Hired first fulltime 
employees 
New CMO hired  
Signed 1st sales contracts 
 2500 items sold mainly 
in Finland as a sign of 
customer need 
Got main VC investor 
who brought 0.4 million 
euros  
2011 Investor become part of 
the management team 
CMO became CEO 
The two original 
founders stepped down 
from management and 
focused solely on R&D 
Published two clinical 
trials in [malady 
symptoms] 
Signed delivery contract 
with health and welfare 
retail chain 
  
2012 New professional CEO 
was appointed by board  
  Received funding from 
the Finnish Funding 
Agency for Innovation 
2013 One of the original 
founders leaves 
Received next  round of 
funding: 7.4 mln euros  
Launched the second 
generation product  
 
 
